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Abstract
Overlay networks are virtual networks, which exist on top of the current Inter
net architecture, and are used in support of peer-to-peer (P2P) applications. The
virtualization provides overlays with the ability to create large, scalable, decentral
ized networks with efficient routing. Many implementations of overlay networks
have come out of academic research. Each provides a unique structure and routing
configuration, aimed at increasing the overall network efficiency for a particular ap
plication. However, they are all threatened by a similar set of severe vulnerabilities.
I explore some of these security deficiencies of overlay network designs and pro
pose a new overlay network security framework Phyllo. This framework aims
to mitigate all of the targeted security problems across a majority of the current
overlay implementations, while only requiring minimal design changes. In order to
demonstrate the validity of Phyllo, it was implemented on top of the Pastry overlay
architecture. The performance and security metrics of the network with the pro
posed framework are evaluated against those of the original in order to demonstrate
the feasibility of Phyllo.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any
given moment. How often, or on what system, the Thought Police plugged in
on any individual wire was guesswork.
George Orwell, 19841
There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's
got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information. What we see
and hear, how we work, what we think... it's all about the information!
Cosmo, Sneakers2
What if someone could exert complete control over your life what you could
say, who you could interact with, where you could go. . . ? For example in George
Orwell's 1984, he describes a futuristic setting, wherein every citizen's actions and
were monitored by the government. Anybody that was deemed to be a threat was
eliminate. Even if they thought about something that they should not, the Thought
Police would erase them from existence.
1G. Orwell, "1984," New York: Signet, 1992.
2 "Sneakers,'' Dir. P.A. Robinson, Perfs. R. Redford, D. Aykroyd, R. Phoenix, DVD, Universal
Pictures, 1992.
Nobody in their right mind would ever willfully allow such Orwellian dominance.
However, this is exactly what a terrorist can do over the Internet, and no one seems
to mind.
Through security flaws in the architectural design of peer-to-peer (P2P) overlay
networks, attackers can control information routes. These networks, which can be
used for applications ranging from file sharing to enabling battlefield communica
tions, could end up being controlled by the enemy. Why should we just give them
the upper-hand in this "information war"?
In order to fight back and mitigate these flaws, I propose a security framework,
Phyllo, that can be implemented on any overlay network. This framework acts
to reorganize the network into groups, allowing for the untrusted members to be
separated from the entire network. Once separated, barriers can be set up to protect
against any attackers and monitoring systems put in place to help identify the
trustworthy in a sea of unknowns.
In an attempt to understand this P2P security framework, the reader first must
be familiarized with the concept behind P2P applications and their overlay networks.
Chapter 2 provides an introduction to these technologies as well as an insight into
their history (Section 2.2). Chapter 3 examines the security issues brought about
through the architectural design of overlay networks and discusses the motivations
behind Phyllo.
From there, we begin to dig into the goals and details of the Phyllo framework.
In Chapter 4, an overview is provided into the modifications and security advantages
of the proposed framework. This establishes the introduction necessary to describe
actual implementation details of applying Phyllo to Pastry [2] , an overlay network
substrate developed out of Rice University. To demonstrate the validity and minimal
overhead of Phyllo, results are given and discussed (Chapter 6). Finally, this thesis
concluded with a look at some previous projects similar to Phyllo (Section 2.4) and
various possible routes for future work with Phyllo in Section 7.1.
Chapter 2
Overlay Networks
P2P its a revolutionary technology. P2P is technically unstoppable.
Most of all, P2P its positive for companies, for the market and its good for
users.
MarcoMontemagno, P2P Manifesto1
Phyllo is a security framework for overlay networks. Now, what is meant by the
term "overlay network"?
2.1 Background
Many people in today's Information Age are familiar with the Internet. They may
even know that the Internet is comprised ofmany interconnected computer systems,
or networks. Therefore, it must follow that an overlay network is also a group of
interconnected computers, right? Well, yes and no.
Computers that are part of an overlay network are indeed connected to one
another. However, unlike other networks, this connection is not a concrete concept.
With the Internet, two computers communicate by establishing a more-or-less direct
:M. Montemagno. P2P Manifesto. 2005. Available Online: http://rotl__ko.hmdnsgroup.com/
~montemag/p2pmanifesto_en.pdf
connection to each other. Overlay networks use a more abstract connection scheme.
Instead of sending a message directly to its destination, overlays forward messages
towards a destination. The distinction here is subtle, but very important; perhaps
an illustration would make these concepts more clear.
Assume that you had an important message to deliver to a friend. If you and
your friend were members of a typical network (e.g., the Internet), you would deliver
the message directly. This could be accomplished by either going out and meeting
your friend personally, or calling your friend and speaking to him/her directly. In
both instances you are the one delivering the message, and you know that the person
that you are talking to is indeed your friend.
Similarly, if you had the same important message that needed to be delivered to
the same friend, but in this case both of you are members of an overlay network. You
might decide to use a courier service to deliver the message. With overlay networks,
there is the introduction of some third-party who you must depend on to deliver
the message. You must trust that this courier: 1) deliver the message and 2) that
the message delivered was the correct message (i.e., the message was not modified
in transit). One of the most famous examples of such indirect communication is the
Byzantine Generals Problem, which will be discussed later.
It is important to note that this type of overlay network communication is often
referred to as peer-to-peer communication.
2.1.1 Peer-to-Peer v. Overlay
Though the terms "peer-to-peer" and "overlay" are often used interchangeably with
regards to computer networks, they are actually two different concepts. An overlay
network, as detailed previously, is a specific network architecture; it describes how
the nodes the computer systems that comprise the network are arranged and
how they communicate. Here, the adjective
"overlay"
means that this network
actually exists on top of an existing network structure. It is often thought of a
virtual network that acts as a parasite, leeching off of another network's (e.g., the
Internet) resources. A diagram of the overlay network host network relationship can
be seen in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Depiction of a Generic Overlay Network. The nodes (gray circles) and
their virtual connections (solid, black lines) are shown overlaying routers (white
circles) and links (dotted lines) of the base network structure.
In Section 2.1, peer-to-peer communication was introduced to describe the courier-
type message transmission employed by overlay networks. To make things even
more confusing, there are applications referred to as peer-to-peer (P2P) applications.
Some examples of such applications include some famous filesharing programs: Nap
ster, Gnutella, Bit Torrent, etc. The feature that qualifies these applications as P2P
is that they use overlay networks to efficiently search for and transfer files. P2P
applications provide the logic and information, while the overlay network takes care
of routing the data from its source towards its intended destination.
However with that said, both terms will be used liberally throughout the re
mained of the paper to refer to the combination of P2P applications and their
overlay networks. Not much differentiation will be made between the two concepts,
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as they are primarily found coupled together. More technical details as to how
an overlay network operates, and how it combines with P2P applications will be
discussed in Chapter 4.
2.2 History
2.2.1 The Evolution of P2P
As explained in [3], the P2P network was actually a forefather to the modern-day
Internet. Its creation was spurred by the invention of the modem, bringing about
a demand for inter-computer collaboration. USENET [4] was developed to fill this
void. It was a simple bulletin board system, designed by two graduate students
at Duke University, where users could dial-in to a main server to read and post
messages. This basic design was remarkably similar to that ofNapster, which would
come a couple of decades later. The problem with USENET was the reliance on a
single server. Whenever the traffic spiked or the system went down, the service was
unavailable.
Tom Jennings attempted to solve this problem with FidoNet [5] . Though devel
oped independently of USENET, it created a USENET-like bulletin board system
over a more decentralized environment; a similar transition to that which would
occur 16 years later in 2000, when Gnutella developed off of Napster. Over time,
USENET and FidoNet managed to solve many of their problems with scalability
and security, so why are we still faced with some of the same issues? As quoted
from George Santayana and reiterated in [3] , "Those who do not remember the past
are condemned to repeat
it."
Unfortunately, the later developers of similar networks did not learn from their
predecessors. Over the past couple of years, there have been a large number of
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P2P networks and applications introduced, all of which have the same fundamental
problems. These security problems are still evident in some of today's overlay net
works (Chapter 3). Some of these more recent (late 1990's) P2P systems include:
Freenet [6], Napster, and Gnutella. Freenet's primary focus was to use the concept
of overlay networks to provide anonymous web browsing. However, its achievements
were dwarfed by the success of the file sharing applications of the time.
The most popular of these applications was Napster [7]. Napster was developed
by Shawn Fanning, in order to share music with his friends. People were able to
connect to the network to share their music, search other's music lists for specific
songs, and then download them. From there, employees at Nullsoft realized the
potential to improve the overlay network to better suit this type of application.
This improvement led to the creation of Gnutella [8]. AOL, the parent company
of NullSoft, soon terminated its development, calling it an "unauthorized freelance
project". Eventually, Gnutella found its way into the public. While Napster concen
trated solely on the sharing of digitized music, Gnutella allowed for a broader range
of files to be shared. Both quickly became very popular applications until around
2001, when they would be brought to a halt because of copyright lawsuits. Since
then, Napster has reemerged as amusic subscription service, and the Gnutella proto
col has been embraced by many other file-sharing applications looking to piggyback
on these applications'fame.
2.2.2 Modern P2P Applications
Several overlay networks have grown out of the post-Napster decentralization push:
Chord, CAN, Pastry, Tapestry, and Spread are only a portion of them. These vir
tual, ad hoc network structures can easily create large, scalable, application-specific
networks. Since their resurgence, many useful applications have be found. Exam-
8
pies include file storage [9], efficient media streaming [10], messaging services [11],
and Internet telephony services, such as Skype [12]. With this paper, we will be
concentrating on the architectures and protocols of Pastry and Chord.
Pastry [2] was developed out of Rice University in 2001. It was designed exploit
the underlying network topology for reduced latency, while using consistent hashing
to provide efficient lookup times. Additionally, like all overlays, Pastry scales well
and is fully decentralized.
At around the same time, MIT was creating Chord [13]. While fundamentally
similar to its Rice University counterpart, Chord does not take advantage of the
underlying network. However, this reduces the overall complexity of the system.
Does this reduced complexity translate into a more secure system?
2.3 Architecture
The architecture of overlay networks has not changed much from its original begin
nings in USENET and FidoNet. New techniques to enhance routing, storage, and
searching capabilities within these networks have improved, along with the speed
and quality of the underlying network. Each of the important architectures along
the evolutionary path of these unique networks will be sufficiently explored to pro
vide a basis for understanding security issues. Special emphasis will be placed on
Chord and Pastry.
2.3.1 USENET and FidoNet
USENET and FidoNet marked the beginning of peer-to-peer interaction, by way of
computer networking. With each of these systems, each participating computer on
the network, a node, was assigned a unique identification number, called the nodeld.
In an attempt to minimize the number of long-distance phone calls, FidoNet imple
mented the identifier, zone : net/node, to label nodes. The idea was to have systems
interact by calling the other nodes that were geographically closest to them. The
zone would identify a large area (e.g. a continent) where the node was contained.
From there, the identity became more and more specific, breaking each zone into
nets, and finally to the actual node. With this structure, the information could be
slowly spread across the globe. Additionally, the system was configured to have the
modems network at night, when the phone rates were the least expensive.
Since such networks overlaid the phone grid, they were faced with a slightly
different set of issues. Firstly, the network only existed for a short period of time.
This means that an potential attacker had only a brief window to damage the
network. Also, efficiency was not a real issue. If the network failed one day, they
would just try again on the next. Secondly, new members had to be manually added
to the network's dial-up list. Only real life acquaintances of current members were
usually permitted to become hubs. The issue of trusting anonymous or unknown
users was nonexistent. Even though many of today's security problems were present
in USENET and FidoNet, other factors from the technology to the implementation
shadowed such deficiencies.
2.3.2 Napster and Gnutella
Despite the lapse of more than a decade from the birth of USENET to that of
Napster, there is not much difference between their underlying architectures. The
main distinctions are that Napster and Gnutella are both built on top of the current
Internet and offer more efficient designs and protocols.
Napster [7] was designed to be fairly centralized; all of the nodes participated
in the network through a central server. When nodes would join, as part of the
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process, they would submit a listing of their available music files to this central
server. It would then be the only contact necessary in order to search for a specific
song. The results, along with the details of the node hosting the selected song, were
returned to the querier so that a direct transfer could be eventually established, by
which to transfer the song file. Such an architecture allowed Napster later to place
restrictions on the searchable material as well as block certain people from joining.
On the other hand, Gnutella [14] did not have any of these control features
available. Since it was implemented as a totally decentralized network, there was
no central point available at which to implement such filtering. This was, however,
their main motivation to put the control into the
users'hands. Additionally,
their design made the network more reliable. The loss of a single node, for example
the Napster server, would not cause any availability issues.
Gnutella, like Napster, supported search features. Due to the lack of a central
server, all searches were flooded through the network. When a node would receive
a search, it would run the query against its list of available files and send back
any results, while flooding more of the network with the search query. The joining
process was also slightly different. A joining node had to contact a bootstrapping
node within the network so that the routing tables could be updated. These features
made Gnutella an uncontrollable threat. From the view of businesses, there was no
easy way to control what was made and not made available on the network. Thus,
further file sharing lawsuits would be deemed necessary [15].
2.3.3 Pastry
Academic institutions adopted some of Gnutella's achievements and improved on
others. The first to go was the inefficient searching techniques. Flooding is a very
expensive network operation as it congests the network with unnecessary traffic.
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Their other primary focus was directed towards improving the overall routing effi
ciency of the network.
Pastry [2] was one such attempt at doing exactly this. The Pastry developers
decided on the use of a ring-like network architecture, where each node exactly two
neighbors (as depicted in Figure 2.3). When each of these nodes joins the network,
they are systematically assigned node IDs and provided with routing information.
Similar to FidoNet, in order to help reduce the roundtrip time, it was decided to
add these nodes based upon a metric of locality. If nodes were assigned IDs based
upon their geographic location, two neighboring nodes in the network ring would
also be geographical neighbors. The idea was that the geographically closer two
nodes were, the fewer hops a packet would have to make. To reinforce this idea, the
node IDs were assigned based upon a hash of the node's IP address, such that two
similar IP addresses hashed to similar IDs.
In addition to an ID, each Pasty node is required to maintain some other in
formation. First, it has to keep track of all of its neighboring nodes in what is
called a LeafSet. Second, the upkeep of a routing table is necessary. This table
is only contains part of the routing information for the entire network. All of this
information, including the ID, is determined and sent to the node at the start of the
Join process (Fig. 2.2). Notice that this process requires the network to properly
route the join request through the network, but how do we route when the final
destination is unknown?
Once the nodes are in place around the ring topology, how do they communi
cate? Communication occurs by way of a routing protocol. Due to the ordering of
the nodes and the configuration of the routing table, all messages can reach their
destination in, at most, log(n) hops2, where n is the number of nodes in the Pastry
network. An example of this routing can be seen in Figure 2.3.
2This metric will be experimentally validated against our Phyllo implementation in Chapter 6.
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Figure 2.3: Simple Pastry Routing Example
All messages are targeted towards a specific destination ID within the boundaries
of the ID space. Whenever amessage is to be sent by a node (either from the message
originating or being forwarded here), the node will first check the destination against
the ID range encompassed by its neighboring nodes. If the destination is in this
range, the message is forwarded to its final destination, the neighboring node with
the ID closest to that of the destination. If it is not within that range, the current
node will access its routing table. This node will then locate the node in its routing
table with the closest ID to the destination and forward the message to that node.
The process continues until the destination is reached or the packet is dropped
because of network congestion, timeout, or similar.
To make this routing as efficient as possible, Pastry uses dynamic routing tables,
referred to as RouteSet or RouteTable. This requires that nodes actively monitor
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the network. They then send out routing updates to inform the rest of the network
of any changes or improvements that should be made to the current routing layout.
When one of these routing update messages is received, the node revises its routing
information (if necessary) according to the information enclosed within the update.
A similar process to this is also used when a node joins or leaves the network. An
overview of this routing protocol can be seen in Figure 2.4.
This is just a brief overview as to the design and functionality of the Pastry
network. Only the necessary elements of Pastry were described to allow for an
appreciation of the architecture and provide enough background knowledge from
which to describe their inherent security flaws. For more detailed information, the
reader is referred to [2].
2.3.4 Chord
Chord [13] is very similar in design to Pastry. It uses a decentralized, ring-like
topology and an architecture that improves performance and scalability metrics.
Therefore, instead of reiterating a majority of Pastry's architecture, we will provide
an explanation of the major differences seen in Chord. Additionally, the motivation
behind such design choices will be explained.
Unlike Pastry. Chord uses a more static routing structure. By doing so, much
of the overhead latency experienced with the Join process of Pastry is eliminated.
Also, this reduces the amount of routing updates that are sent, thereby reducing
congestion. Chord's designers argue that the simplicity of their architecture more
than compensates for the minimal gains accrued from Pastry's dynamic routing.
Another difference between these two architectures is that Chord does not assume
anything about the underlying network. While Pastry tries to organized nodes by
15
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their geographical distances, Chord randomly assigns the joining nodes throughout
the entire ID space.
There exist many more variations of P2P applications and overlay architectures
than are described here. We only attempt to highlight the necessary architectures
with which to explain some of the history behind the development of the modern
overlay network and its underlying security problems. Many of the other overlays,
some of which have been previously mentioned, have very similar architectures to
the ones described.
2.4 Related Work
There has been several previous projects that have examined the security problems
surrounding P2P networks. Several of these solutions [16,17], we viewed as un
fit as they went against the openness and public nature that caused the network's
success. The addition of central certificate authorities (trusted servers) to control
admission or to handle the assignment of node IDs creates a single point of failure,
a solitary target for attackers to focus upon. Furthermore, some of the mitigation
techniques, especially those in [16], required additional protocols and massive com
munication overheads. Phyllo was developed to be overlay independent and easily
implementable, while only suggesting that only relatively minor changes be made.
Most importantly, Phyllo is transparent to the P2P application. Aside from the
security aspect of P2P networks, there has been research done into various hierar
chical P2P systems and peer evaluation techniques - - both of which are integral
parts of Phyllo.
Hierarchical architectures have already been imposed upon overlay systems [18-
20]. However, the research has always been interested in its routing capabilities
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never its use in security. More straightforward implementations, such as [18], have
merged multiple, distinct overlays into a unified overlay network. Select nodes from
each of the original networks were chosen to act as routing gateways. While similar
to our system in basic design, it is still vulnerable to the same set of overlay security
problems.
HIERAS [19] attempts to decrease routing times by partitioning nodes based
upon their link latency. While this does reduce transmission times, it has no impact
on the network's security. Malicious nodes can still cause massive damage. Further
more, [18] and [19] are static hierarchies; once a node has joined, the node can not
move to a different hierarchical partition.
Our Phyllo framework also shares some characteristics with Jelly [20]. Jelly is
a framework that arranges nodes into hierarchies based upon network loads and
locality; this aims to reduce transmission times. Additionally, Jelly balances its
hierarchy layers by dynamically moving nodes between the layers, similar to the
promotion and demotion capabilities of Phyllo. Juxtaposed, it is evident that Jelly
offers no security advantages.
Phyllo provides a framework for network pluggable node evaluation schemes
(Section 5.4). Many research attempts into this area can be implemented in sup
port of Phyllo, such as [21,22]. Other schemes [23,24] are not candidates for our
framework, as they a require joining node to "pay its
due" before fully participating
in the network. We believe that this approach is in opposition to the openness tenet
of overlay networks. Instead, Phyllo offers better routing performance and more
responsibility for well behaved nodes. There is no punishment for new or unknown
participants.
In terms of P2P security, Secure Overlay Services (SOS) [25] offers a way to
mitigate denial of service attacks. It is able to provide transport-level encryption
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in support of secure communications, along with access control policies and logging
capabilities, for grid networks through its Peer-to-Peer Security Layer Framework
(P2PSLF). P2PSLF secures a messages integrity and confidentiality, but ignores
the fact that malicious nodes may just drop the protected message.
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Chapter 3
Overlay Security Issues
Never underestimate the time, expense, and effort an opponent will expend
to break a code.
Robert Morris
Due to their architecture, overlay networks inherit some security issues. Many of
these security problems have been documented as, and still remain, open problems.
One of the main issues regarding all of these problems is that most of the proposed
solutions disrupt the service features of overlay networks.
All security researchers are faced with the same balancing act how to introduce
security measures without hampering the productivity of the entire system. For
most systems it involves some compromise, virus protection in exchange for higher
resource usage, or user authentication for decrease production due to login times,
lost passwords, etc. However, this problem is amplified in overlay architectures. As
presented previously, in Section 2.3, the architectures all exploit the assignment of
nodelds to gain significant routing advantages.
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3.1 ID Assignment Problem
One of the revolutionary, new features of overlay networks is the distributing routing,
which allows for scalable, efficient networks. This is possible through the use of
the clever association between nodelds and search keys. Additionally, due to the
network layout, each node knows the best path towards any other node (or key).
These are both designed to be efficient, assuming the random distribution of the
IDs and keys. In Pastry, for example, the nodelds suppose to be assigned based on
the physical location of each node. Therefore, neighboring nodes in the network are
also relatively close physically close.
However, this strength could also be turned into a major security hazard. If a
malicious user could can control a large portion of nodes in the same area of the
network, they could disconnect the routing circle of Pastry. Any messages sent
through this portion of the network could be dropped, forcing each message to be
resent in another direction. The more groups of nodes that an attacker controls, the
more partitioned the network may become.
This issue is even further compounded when examined relative to the Sybil
attack [26]. With this attack, malicious users flood a peer-to-peer network with
new nodelds such that each node is represented by several different IDs. Douceur
argues that this attack can only be prevented through the use of some sort of central
authority (e.g. VeriSign or ICANN) must be used. He further reasons that it is not
realistic for collaborative communities, such as peer groups, to be able to identify
masquerading nodes.
The use of node IDs can be seen in the newer networks Pastry and Chord,
among others as well as in the architecture of USENET and FidoNet. Thus, a
majority of them can be targeted by these attacks. However, it is easier to perform
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such an attack on networks that do not randomly assign IDs. For an attacker to
gain control of a large portion of a Pastry network, they would just have to join
with a bunch of nodes with similar IPs (or execute a Sybil attack) . Contrarily, some
of the other P2P networks, such as Napster, and Gnutella, are not as susceptible.
They were built to provide anonymous access, therefore many nodes are not even
given keys.
To mitigate the possibility of this occurring, the network must ensure that all
incoming nodes are randomly dispersed throughout the ID space. One proposed
solution is to use a certificate authority to assign the IDs. This brings up a couple of
problems: (1) the certificate authority is against the basic principles of decentralized
networks, it provides a single point-of-failure, and it does not scale; (2) randomly
assigning the nodes eliminates the potential to reduce the round-trip time (RTT)
between adjacent nodes. This second issue could cause messages to be routed across
the globe several times before reaching its destination. In this case, the negative
effect outweighs the slight security improvement.
3.2 Message Forwarding
Problems with message forwarding have been around for centuries, dating all the
way back to the Byzantine Empire. In the classical problem known as the Byzan
tine Generals Problem [27] , the generals of the Byzantine army had to come to a
unanimous decision whether or not they should attack an enemy. Since the generals
are located throughout the empire, they can only communicate through messengers.
How can a general be sure that the correct message was delivered?
To be sure that the messenger acted in good faith, we need to solve two problems.
"Was the message delivered?" And if it was, "was it the correct
message?"Only
22
an affirmative response to both can guarantee to the general that the messenger did
not betray him. However, if the message was not received or an incorrect message
was received, it does not necessarily implicate the messenger. What if the messenger
died or was taken captive along the way? Or maybe the other general was not there?
What if the scribe made a mistake in writing the message? If a message is lost, it
may not be the messenger who is to blame.
This same situation, which was present in the days of FidoNet, is still applicable
to every overlay routing architecture. It is possible for a malicious node to act as a
bad messenger and deliver a bad message or no message at all. The obvious solution
would be to verify through another source that the correct message did arrive. This
solution, however, cause the same problem what if the verifier lies? It is also
within the realm of possibilities for the underlying network to drop the message
(read: packet) because of network congestion, or for the data became corrupted.
There have been many attempts to solve the Byzantine Generals Problem,
namely the Byzantine Agreement protocol [28]. This protocol allows for two gen
erals to verify the message from a third general. However, the implementations of
this protocol depend on point-to-point communications or central servers.
As an overlay solution to this problem, [16] proposes that a failure test be per
formed to detect whether or not the message arrived. If the test shows that the
routing failed, or if the test times out, the original message can be sent using redun
dant routing. This method of routing will send out multiple copies of the message
through various channels with the hope that at least one will arrive at the correct
destination.
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3.3 Routing Table Maintenance
To maximize the efficiency of the network, it is often required that the routing table
be dynamic. If any connection were to die or any nodes were to join or leave the
network, the routing tables must be adjusted accordingly. These dynamic tables
also allow for nodes to determine the best routes, similar to many of the routing
algorithms in use in today's Internet.
In order to control the table maintenance among the nodes, underlying routing
update messages must be exchanged. As with the prior problems, the routing pro
tocols assume that all of these updates are not malicious in intent. Attackers can
easily take advantage of this assumption by distributing bad routing information.
Without being able to verify the correctness of this data or the intent of the orig
inating node, the receiving nodes are force to accept it, hopefully to improve the
efficiency of the network.
As detailed in [16] and [29], overlays that impose weak constraints on which
nodes can be in the routing table, such as Pastry, are more susceptible to these
attacks. Chord, on the other hand, uses a constrained routing table. It requires that
the nodes in the routing table have the closest nodelds to a specified ID. Pastry's
implementation is leveraged towards performance, while Chord focuses on security
and stability. Naturally, to improve the security on all networks we should follow
in the steps of Chord and use more restrictive routing techniques. Older versions
of overlay networks did used very crude flooding algorithms to route information
through the network. Their lack of a dependence on routing tables makes them
immune to bad routing data.
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3.4 Lookup Attacks
It is also possible for malicious nodes to exploit the lookup service employed in some
P2P systems. This service is intended to be used by nodes to locate data. Akin to
the problem ofmessage forwarding, malicious nodes can exploit the lookup protocol.
Since in networks such as Chord, nodes can track the progress of their lookup
calls, it is not enough for a malicious node to just drop the request. If this were to
consistently happen, nodes may begin to suspect the malicious intent of such a node.
Instead the malicious node must participate in the lookup protocol to the extent
that it does forward out the lookup messages. The key to attacking this protocol is
to forward these messages away from the destination or to nonexistent nodes.
From the point of view of the node that originated the message, the malicious
node is viewed as a normal, participating member. The originating node has no way
of knowing that the other node did not forward the packet correctly. If the lookup
fails, it is attributed to packet loss on the underlying network structure. If it succeeds
by way of the malicious node, the requesting node will have bad information.
So far, the only attempts being made to counter this problem are similar to
those of the message forwarding attack. Therefore, the solutions involve too much
bandwidth and processing overhead in order to detect.
3.5 Denial of Service
In addition to the typical denial of services attacks that can be performed on the
Internet, every type of overlay network is also vulnerable. In this category we place
all attacks that are concerned with reducing the network's availability. The common
targets of such attacks are usually central management or authentication servers,
which control the entire network. Even though these servers are not present, there
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do exist several different types of attacks that can be carried out by malicious nodes
that can hamper these decentralized networks.
The first type of attack is the typical denial of service attack that occurs as an
effect of congesting the network with too much data. A node can simply flood the
network with multiple lookup, routing, or request messages. If these messages are
received faster than they can be processed, the nodes will become overburdened and
other nodes cannot perform any meaningful operations. This particular attack can
either target a specific group of nodes or the entire network.
Another example of a P2P denial of service attack is the continued and rapid
joining and leaving of a node. Every time a node joins, the network must update
itself through the bootstrapping process. With this process, the joining node is
provided with the necessary routing and network information, while the other nodes
are alerted to the presence of the new node. A reverse process may happen if a
node leaves by informing the network of its departure. If this does not happen,
the remaining nodes will find out because of dropped messages and will use routing
updates to inform the other nodes. Repeatedly joining and leaving causes this whole
process to exhaust network resources and reduce availability.
There exist other forms of attacks, such as the aforementioned Sybil attack, that
have a side effect of harming the performance and availability of the network. As
with all prior denial of service attacks, a good solution does not exist. Current
research shows some promise in detecting these attacks by analyzing the network
traffic. If this traffic abnormally peaks, it might be the sign of a current denial of
service attack. Unfortunately, there is no additional advantage that peer networks
have to try to mitigate this type of abuse.
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Chapter 4
Phyllo: An Overlay Security
Framework
You cannot escape the responsibility of tomorrow by evading it today.
Abraham Lincoln
4.1 The Motivation
The primary drive behind Phyllo's development is not only the architectural
secu-
ritv issues within overlay design detailed in Chapter 3, but also the effects of the
exploitation of one of these flaws.
Bv taking advantage of the P2P routing, for example, an attackers can control
the entire network. The weakness in the routing scheme allows them to filter and
manipulate all of the network traffic! If present only in relatively small numbers,
attackers may only be able to exert control over specific points. As their numbers
increase (as compared to the size of the network), they will be able to dominate
more and more of the network. If this is the situation if the attackers operate
independently of one another, just imagine the potential if they worked together. . .
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4.2 The Framework
The Phyllo overlay security framework is designed to adjust the underlying archi
tecture of the various overlay networks. Its goal is to be small and easily adaptive to
all overlay network architectures, while providing increased security with minimal
communication overhead. Phyllo can be divided into three separate parts: (1) the
structure/topology changes, (2) routing modifications, and (3) the promotion and
demotion protocols. The topology and routing changes are relatively straightfor
ward and are presented in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. Part #3, the promotion and
demotion protocol, is a new concept unique to Phyllo. It allows for the controlled
movement of nodes between the various sections of the topology and is introduced
in Section 4.2.3.
4.2.1 Phyllo Structure
To accomplish such a seemingly daunting task, Phyllo uses an adapted hierarchi
cal structure. This structure can be easily adapted for most topologies; the only
requirement is that the nodes must be identified by unique tag, which must have
a natural ordering. For example, Phyllo can be used on the ring-like structure of
Pasty [2] or Chord [13]. A visualization of such a topology can be seen in Figure 4.1.
The name "phyllo" describes the leaf-like image created by the introduction of
the hierarchical topology. When viewed on a Pastry-like ring topology, the minor
partitions give the appearance of leaves branching off of a tree trunk (Fig. 4.1). The
term "phyllo" is a prefix, derived from Greek, meaning "leaf". Furthermore, the
name pays homage to the Pastry [2] overlay network on which Phyllo was initially
implemented.
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Figure 4.1: Phyllo hierarchy on a P2P ring topology. The minor and major nodes
are colored in white and black, respectively. The A denotes a major, anchor node.
Definitions
The security advantages of Phyllo are derived from this hierarchical topology. How
ever, before describing these advantages, it is first necessary to formally introduce
some terminology that will be used throughout the remainder of this paper. First
off, there is the notion of a node, or a single member of a network; there is not nec
essarily a one-to-one correspondence between nodes and computers, as a computer
can be simultaneously acting as several members of a network. When the nodes
join to the P2P network, they are added to one of the hierarchical divisions within
Phyllo. A division is referred to as a partition. The number of partitions and how
to decide to which partitions the nodes are added is a problem that is left up to the
implementor of the network.
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In this case, since we are dealing with security, we divide the Phyllo network into
two partitions and a node's partition membership is based upon how much we trust
it will it act for the good of the entire network, or will it try to be selfish? We
refer to these two partitions as the major partition(e.g., nodes 00, 42, and 91 from
Fig. 4.1) and the minor partition (nodes 00, 20, 3B, 91, and F0). It is important to
note that all Phyllo partitions use the same ID space, and the membership within
these partitions is exclusive. A node must belong to exactly one partition. If the
node is part of the major partition, then we call that node a major node (e.g., nodes
00, 42, and 91 from Fig. 4.1). Likewise, if it is in a minor partition, the node is a
minor node: nodes IC, 24, 9C, etc.
In addition to these two node types, we also define a third node type, an anchor
node. Anchor nodes are members of the major partition, but have the additional
responsibility of being linked to at least one minor partition. They act as the link
between the partitions, determining what information can be exchanged.
Hierarchical Structure
The security benefits gained from the hierarchical layout, stem directly from these
anchor nodes. When the anchor nodes server as the middleman, they also function
as a filter or firewall. This effectively divides the partitions into to independent
networks that happen to share the anchor node(s); nodes in one partition are never
made aware of the existence of any other nodes outside of that node's partition.
Additionally, they can be used to monitor the activities of the nodes of the minor
partitions to which it is linked. This information can be later used as input in
order to make generalizations about the intent of a node, based upon the anchor's
interaction with that node. These generalizations can be later used by the promotion
or demotion protocol to move a target node into or out of the major partition. The
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monitor also acts as insurance that an anchor does not abuse its power, since it is
being monitored by neighboring major nodes.
4.2.2 Phyllo Routing
At the partition level. Phyllo does not make any changes to the routing protocol
of the original network (e.g., Chord, Pastry. CAN). It is only when the routing is
viewed from the network's perspective that Phyllo's presence is made evident.
Phyllo distinguishes between two different P2P message types. An application
message comes from the P2P application utilizing Phyllo. These messages allow
the users of the application to perform various tasks such as searching, responding,
and transferring files (in the case of a filesharing application). The other type of
message is that which is necessary in order to perform typical network maintenance.
These overlay messages are static and defined by Phyllo or the underlying overlay
network implementation, whereas application messages are define within the P2P
application.
Overlay Message Routing
Since overlay messages are necessary for the networks operation, their control is
vital to the maintenance of the hierarchical structure. Though important, this is
only of secondary concern within Phyllo. for it is this message type that allows for
an attacker to execute the Routing Table Maintenance attack (Section 3.3).
Generally, the overlay messages are not routed; they are sent directly to a node's
neighbors. Since the information contained within is only applicable locally, there
is no need to
"flood"
the updates to the whole network. Phyllo maintains the same
approach when dealing with overlay messages. However, Phyllo provides a more
stringent definition to being a "node's neighbor."
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Expanding upon the standard notion of neighbors (i.e., "the n [numerically]
closest nodes to a given node"), Phyllo adds the additional restriction that the nodes
must all be members of the same partition. This is where the anchor nodes, and
the fact that they are members of both the major and adjoining minor partitions,
comes into play. It is the responsibility of the anchor nodes to act as border guards,
ensuring that the overlay messages do not cross the partition boundaries. Instead of
blocking the communications as they occur (similar to a firewall), the anchor nodes
just verify that the routing update overlay messages do not specify nodes outside of
the recipient's partition.
Application Message Routing
All of the changes to the underlying application message routing protocol (Fig
ure 2.3) are done in support of the hierarchical structure of Phyllo. The addition of
the security partitions make the routing a little more complex. While transmitting
a message through peers, towards the one closest to the message's destination, the
message may have to cross the partition boundaries up to two times. Therefore, the
anchor nodes must be able to tell when to continue to route in the major partition
and when it is necessary to send it to one of the adjoined minor partitions.
Simply, this is done through a comparison between the current anchor node's ID
and its neighboring anchor node's ID (assuming a minor partition is present between
them). If the ID is between them, the message will be sent to that minor partition.
In any other case, the message remains in the major partition. Such a check is
necessary because a minor partition may grow to a size where every member cannot
be tracked by the anchor nodes.
To further explain this routing, we will refer to Figure 4.2, which shows amessage
being routed between two different minor partitions. To simplify the understanding,
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Figure 4.2: The Three (3) Stages of Minor-to-Minor Node Phyllo Routing
the routing process is broken down into three stages. Initially, a message sent from a
minor node is routed through that node's partition towards the destination address.
Eventually, it reaches the anchor node closest to that destination (Stage I). The
next stage (Stage II), involve the message's continued routing through the major
partition. At some point, it arrives at the major node with the closest ID to the
message's destination. Here, if this major node is not an anchor node, the routing
process is complete and message is at its target. Otherwise, the major node is
an anchor, and the message's destination is checked against the range of its minor
partition IDs. If the destination is in that range, the message is transitioned into,
and routed within, that minor partition (Stage III).
A flow chart diagraming the entire application message inter-partition routing
can be found in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: Flow chart of the Application Message Inter-partition Routing Process
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4.2.3 Phyllo Promotion and Demotion Protocols
The revolutionary feature of Phyllo, is it's ability to d\-namically move nodes be
tween hierarchical partitions. This allows for the control of nodes based on their
behavior, or other scheme, which can be declared by the implementor of the
over-
la}-
network. Instead of a more static evaluation, Phyllo's promotion and demotion
protocols recognize that the variable of time is important in the realm of security.
A computer system maintenance is a cyclic process a machine may be controlled
by a remote attacker or \irus at one moment, then reverted to a normal, localized
control by an attentive system administrator or actions taken by anti-virus software
or intrusion detection systems (IDS).
It is important to understand that there must be some underlying configuration
and implementation in order to tailor the promotion and demotion protocols to suite
the requirements of the P2P application. Every network application is designed
to target very specific use cases, and thus any supporting systems must also be
adapted to fit these goals. For example, a backup banking network, which might
operate over an ad hoc conglomeration of various banking institutions, is going to
require very stringent controls, preferring to be on the secure side of the security
vs. usability scale. Meanwhile, a P2P application to support open data sharing
between organizations and researchers worldwide, may be interested in preserving
some minimal control over the nodes to ensure some level of data integrity.
Phyllo has a trust evaluation framework in place that allows for such a granularity
of control. The accuracy of evaluation of an implementation of this framework is
describe in terms of a. a is a percentage indicating how often the evaluated metric
is correct. An a value of 90% means that the associated trust evaluation system
detects malicious (non-trustful) nodes correctly every 9 out of 10 tries (or has a
failure rate of 1 in 10). The tradeoff here is that to achieve a better accuracy,
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more information will have to be exchanged and stored, which reduces the network
scalability and bandwidth.
The goal of the framework is to be flexible enough to support any desired means
of evaluation, including the P2P trust assignment schemes presented in [21, 22,
30]. Implementation details, as well as potential uses, of Phyllo's trust evaluation
framework will be further discussed in Chapter 5.
Promotion Protocol
The Promotion protocol servers to improve the efficiency of the network. As will
be demonstrated in Chapter 6, the average hop count is minimal when all of the
nodes are contained in the major partition. Therefore, Phyllo would like to promote
every node as soon as its trust evaluation metric is sufficient. Additionally, Phyllo's
architectural can lead to network bottlenecks occurring at the anchor nodes. The
promotion of a node leads to one more anchor nodes as well as the splitting of a
minor partition. Not only can promotion help with security, but also with improving
network efficiency.
CJ
Figure 4.4: Phyllo Promotion Protocol
The promotion protocol operates as follows (referencing Figure 4.4):
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1 . An anchor node ax scans the trust evaluation ratings of the minor nodes con
nected to it.
2. ai selects a minor node nip for promotion, based on the minor node's high
rating.
3. ai informs mp and the opposing anchor node a2 of the impending promotion.
4. mp receives the promotion message and splits its list of neighbor nodes into
its two new minor partitions: nodes with IDs between at and mp go into
one minor partition, and the ones with IDs from mp to a2 go into the other
partition.
5. a2 receives the promotion message and updates its minor partition that con
tains mp only the nodes with IDs between mp and a2 are kept, the others
are deleted. a2 sends the updated partition and routing information to that
minor partition.
6. ai likewise updates its minor partition, keeping only the nodes between itself
and mp. ax sends the updated partition and routing information to that minor
partition.
7. a2 circulates the updated major partition information, with mps promotion,
to the rest of the major partition.
After this process1 is complete, mp has been promoted to an anchor node am and
the old minor partition between ai and a2 is now split.
Demotion Protocol
Phyllo's Demotion protocol acts in opposition to the Promotion protocol; every
thing done wdth promotion, can be undone with demotion. The main reason for
including a demotion protocol is to handle any nodes that exploit the Promotion
protocol by behaving in accordance to the network's goals until they are promoted.
Once the promotion would occur, Phyllo could no longer offer any protection. The
Demotion protocol is Phyllo's last line of defense against intelligent attackers or the
compromising of systems hosting major nodes. Furthermore, a loss of any anchor
Promotion protocol steps #4-7 occur in parallel, so their actual sequence in practice will vary.
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node can be viewed as a demotion of that node, alleviating the problem caused by
such a dynamic network.
"o" \ o ''d::'.-
Figure 4.5: Phyllo Demotion Protocol
The Demotion protocol operates in the same manner as the Promotion protocol,
but performs the converse of each operation. The Demotion protocol (Figure 4.5)
operates by:
1. A potentially harmful major node, m^, is identified by another major node
mi.
2. mi notifies the neighboring major nodes, including m^, of m/s upcoming
demotion.
3. When mj receives the message of its demotion, it removes the neighbor nodes
from its current (major) routing table and moves each of its minor partition's
routing information to the primary routing table. m& then notifies this new
partition (which includes mi and m2) of the new routing changes.
4. The other major nodes, when they hear of node m/s demotion, simply remove
m<i from their routing tables. If m^ is bad, they do not want to even know of
it.
Upon completion, the common minor partitions between mi, m2, and mj are joined
into one minor partition, with mi and m2 as anchors, m^ is now a minor node in
that minor partition.
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Disobedient Nodes
Both the Promotion and Demotion depend on some cooperation from the nodes.
If some of these node are not trustworthy, how can we rely on them following the
protocols? Simply put, we cannot. However, the way the protocols are designed,
disobedient nodes can only bring harm to themselves.
This feature comes from the way Phyllo assigns the minor and major tags. A
node is either major or minor depending on how another node views it. A minor node
is viewed by another minor node as being a major node, since it has no knowledge
of the major partition. Whenever a node receives a message, it checks the message's
last sender and handles the message with respect to how it views that transmitting
node.
What does this gain us in terms of disobedient nodes? This means that if a
node tries to fool the protocol, its neighbors will still be informed of the promotion
or demotion. If the node attempts to act differently from how its neighbors view
it, all of its messages will be dropped because the sending node is not known by
the recipient. This type of attempted exploit is easily detectable, but Phyllo does
not current support any way of punishing or removing the misbehaving node (apart
from its promotion or demotion).
Even in an absolute worst case scenario when the protocols fail, Phyllo will
be effectively removed. The overlay network would lose its hierarchical structure
and would function as the underlying overlay implementation (e.g., Pastry, Chord,
CAN). Phyllo can never be exploited to decrease security, beyond what it was with
out the framework in place.
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Chapter 5
Implementation: Phyllo Pastry
This is my answer to the gap between ideas and action I will write it out.
Hortense Calisher
Phyllo was implemented on Rice University's Pastry Overlay Networking Substrate
1.4 [2] for Java, version 1.4.2. The programming was done primarily with eclipse
IDE 3.0.1. The final Phyllo package was released as Phyllo. jar, which consisted
of the rit. secure.pastry Phyllo package and a few experimental applications.
This section will dig into the detail of the actual Phyllo implementation on
Pastry. It is not necessary to understand the contents of this chapter in order to
appreciate Phyllo's design and improved security capabilities. The following sections
will elaborate on the internals of the Pastry-specific adaptation of the architecture
and protocols discussed in Chapter 4.
All objects referenced in typewriter font should be assumed to be part of
Phyllo's rit .secure. pastry package, unless otherwise specified. The italic font
refers to basic Pastry objects found in Rice University's Pastry implementation
(rice.pastry Java package).
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5.1 Hierarchical Structure
The actual Phyllo node is located in rit .secure.pastry. SecPastryNode. This
object contains only the core logic necessary to exist (has an ID and can store overlay
data) and may, optionally, execute a thread (rit . secure . pastry . SecPastryNode .
PromotionEvaluator) to interface with the trust evaluation implementation. This
thread will periodical!}- scan through the data gathered from the messages and other
sources, and recommend nodes for promotion or demotion.
The network data that each node stores consists of a routing table and leaf set
for each partition it is a member of. A leaf set stores the closest nodes, in terms of
locality, while the routing table saves references to nodes elsewhere in the partition.
Phyllo uses the term "primary" to refer to the leaf set or routing table for the
partition to which a node belongs. Anchor nodes will also have one or two "minor"
sets of information one for each attached minor partition.
The protocols surrounding the transmission of these leaf sets and routing tables is
declared within rit . secure .pastry . standard nest in PartitionLeafSetProtocol
and PartitionRouteSetProtocol, respectively. Both use overlay messages to dis
seminate the necessary information only to their partition. The RouteSet protocol is
primarily used for more efficient routing over a large number of nodes. Since Phyllo
partitions the nodes, Phyllo does not benefit as much as Pastry from this data.
The LeafSet protocol informs the network of some change: (1) a joining node (Sec
tion 5.3), (2) lost or dropped node, or (3) a node receiving a promotion or demotion
(Section 5.5), are just a couple of uses.
Since Phyllo's hierarchical structure was designed specifically with the ring net
work topology in mind, there are no surprises with the implementation; each node
just has to keep track of some additional sets of information. However, to make
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the partitioned structure possible, there needed to be some changes made to the
underlying routing and join protocols of Pastry.
5.2 Routing Protocol
As stated previously, there are two types of messages in Phyllo: overlay messages
and application messages. There is no need to route overlay messages, since they are
send directly from a node to one of its neighbors. However, all of the application-
specific messages need to be routed from the application, down through the local
node, then through the network (multiple intermediary nodes), and finally to its
destination node and application.
The resultant Phyllo routing algorithm (Fig. 4.3), as implemented in rit . secure .
pastry. standard.PartitionRouter, is as it was described in the previous chap
ter! For each received RouteMessage, Phyllo's router determines the best next
hop based upon the destination. The method partition.PartitionLeafSet .
mostSimilarO, which was adapted from Pastry's LeafSet to include the extreme
nodes in the leaf set, performs this comparison.
Figure 5.1 provides a much more detailed look at the application message rout
ing in Phyllo-Pastry. A P2P application creates a message and starts the routing
process towards a chosen destination (step 1). That message gets passed through
the PastryAppl abstract class where it is embedded in a RouteMessage wrapper
(step 2). From here, the RouteMessage is sent through the local node receiving
methods (steps 3-4) and ends up in the MessageDispatch center (step 5). Then
(step 6), the standard.PartitionRouter finds the best next hop. At this stage,
Phyllo decides whether the route message should remain in the current partition or
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Figure 5.1: Sequence Diagram for a Application Protocol Routing
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switch to another. The PartitionRouter then sends the updated RouteMessage to
the local NodeHandle to be forwarded.
At step 7, the message is finally transmitted to the next node, who passes it to a
local instance of the P2P application (step 8). At the next step, the protocol checks
to see whether the received route message is destined for the current application.
If it is, the message is left with the application for processing and the routing is
complete. However, if it is not, the RouteMessage is passed back down to the local
NodeHandle through rice.pastry.RouteMessage. routeMessageO (step 10), and
the routing process returns to step 5 to route the message on to the next hop.
5.3 Join Protocol
Like the routing protocol, Pastry's join protocol had to also be modified to support
Phyllo's partitions. Though the protocol itself is fairly simplistic, within Phyllo it
has some very important responsibilities. The entire routing protocol, as described
previously, depends on a set of assumptions. It is up to the join protocol to ensure
that the network is built in such a manner that these expectations are met.
The process flow of the partition join protocol in Phyllo, as implemented in rit .
secure. pastry. standard.PartitionJoinProtocol is presented in Figure 5.2. Note
that the third stage, "Route the join request to the node with the closest ID to the
joining
node's"
, makes use of the application level routing detailed in the previous
section. Upon initial reception of a join request, the request is encapsulated in a
RouteMessage and routed towards its new position in the network.
At the termination of the join process, one of three outcomes will be reached:
(1) allow the node to join the major partition, (2) allow the node to join a minor
partition, or (3) deny the join request. There are only two sets of circumstances,
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Figure 5.2: Flow chart of the Phyllo-Pastry Join Protocol
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under which a node is not permitted to join the network: (1) the ID that the node is
attempting to join under already exists, which is a precondition of Pastry to ensure
proper routing; or (2) there is no room in the minor partition, as limited by Phyllo
and the trust evaluation framework (see Sect. 5.4).
If the node is allowed to join, the partition it joins into is decided based upon
some requirements stipulated by Phyllo. When dealing with a circular ID space,
there is no easy way to compare IDs. There is no reliable way to perform logi
cal comparisons of one node's location to another. For example, in an ID space of
0xFF(255), is 0x60(96) less than or greater than 0x75(123)? How about 0x.F(254)?
Since we are in a circular space, 0x60 is both greater than and less than 0x7B, and
the same goes for 0xFE\
Ifwe envision the ID space as a full circle, we can talk about node relationships as
being clockwise or counterclockwise from one another. This is all the further Pastry
needs to go, but Phyllo needs a little more. For partitions to work, for every major
node, there must be a major node located counterclockwise from it and another
located clockwise. To avoid the circularity problem, a node (e.g., 0x7B) is clockwise
from a given node (0x60) only if the node exists on the clockwise half of the circle
when divided through the given node (see Fig. 5.3), likewise for a counterclockwise
node (OxFE) . Therefore, nodes with the ID on exact opposite locations in the circle
are neither clockwise nor counterclockwise from one another.
The solution is that the join protocol must setup the network per these require
ments. Namely, nodes cannot be added to a minor partition too prematurely. The
join protocol must check to ensure that there is proper ID distribution in that section
of the network before deciding whether or not to add the new node to a minor par
tition. This only needs to occur at the highest partition level, the major partition.
If it is assured there, then it is guaranteed at every partition beneath it.
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Figure 5.3: Comparing nodes in circular ID spaces
5.4 Trust Evaluation Framework
The trust evaluation framework exists to allow different overlay networks to tailor
the promotion and demotion protocols to their needs. One network could use a static
major partition (a la Napster [7]), another network might have a fist of privileged
nodes that can be promoted, while a third wants the network to configure itself
dynamically to maximize routing efficiency. Generally, the framework was designed
to be flexible and not require additional network overhead.
A trust evaluation framework is rated based upon its a value the percentage
of nodes that it correctly identifies (as being either malicious or trustworthy). Since
this is a largely hypothetical value, Phyllo has the ability to simulate various a
values. For example, rit .secure.pastry. testing.TestRouteTableDurability
supports a simulated a value; the value can be specified on the command line using
the eval flag:
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bash$ Java TestRouteTableDurability -eval 99
This will tell the trust evaluation framework to run with a = 99% accuracy.
The actual framework, as implemented by Phyllo within Pastry, consists of
two interfaces: rit . secure . pastry . promotion . PromotionEvaluation and rit .
secure. pastry. promotion. ForcedPromotionEvaluation. The latter consists of
only three methods for use only with the forced promotion protocol. These meth
ods include: (1) getBestNode (Id, boolean), (2) splitMinorPartitionQ, and (3)
promoted (NodeHandle). getBestNode () finds the node with the best trust metric
rating in the specified minor partition with an ID closest to that passed in as a
parameter. Ideally, this ID should be at the mid-point of the range covered by the
partition. This will achieve the maximal division, assuming a purely random ID
distribution. The splitMinorPartitionO method will check to see if either minor
partition, if they exist, should be split. Finally, promoted (NodeHandle) commu
nicates to the framework that the node with the specified NodeHandle was just
promoted. From there, the framework implementation might need to perform some
updating of its trust statistics.
The other interface piece, promotion.PromotionEvaluation, takes care of the
standard promotion and demotion protocols. There are nine total methods, which
include some noticeable overlap from the ForcedPromotionEvaluation interface:
(1) allowJoin(NodeHandle), (2) evaluate (Message), (3) getDemotionNodeO,
(4) getPromotionNodeO, (5) haveDemotionsO, (6) havePromotionsO,
(7) demoted (NodeHandle), (8) promoted (NodeHandle), and (9) remove (NodeHandle).
The allowJoin method is used by the join protocol in Phyllo to test to see if a node
should be allowed to join. Methods 7-9 are used to inform the framework of any net
work activity. The havePromotionsO and getPromotionNodeO methods are used
to begin the promotion protocol, testing whether there are nodes to be promoted and
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then retrieving those nodes; haveDemotionsO andgetDemotionNodeO perform the
same function, but for the demotion protocol. Last of all, the evaluate (Message)
method is called to allow the framework implementation to examine the contents
of a just-received message. This is so a framework can perform some evaluations to
ensure that the message has been properly forwarded, has the correct contents, etc.
These interface methods are explained further in the associated JavaDocs found
in Appendix B. Examples of implemented trust evaluation schemes can be found
in rit .secure.pastry. testing.MinorPartitionEnforcement and rit. secure.
pastry. testing.BasicEvaluation. The first instance primarily makes use of the
ForcedPromotionEvaluation interface to promote the most qualified node only
when the minor partition reaches maximum capacity. The other model allows for
node promotion and demotion based upon evaluating each received message to en
sure the message was properly forwarded.
Some research has already been done into evaluating overlay nodes, and the
trust evaluation framework is flexible enough to support implementations from any
related research. Examples include incorporating trust management schemes of the
EigenTrust algorithm [22] or the global trust model proposed in [21]. Nielson, in [30],
describes a few solutions to defend against "self-interested nodes" nodes, such as
those in participating in a Byzantine Generals-type attack, that do not act for the
good of the overall network. These are all valid uses of our evaluation framework.
Additionally, techniques not developed specifically for P2P networks, can be adapted
for use within Phyllo. One instance would be to use concepts for gauging the trust
value of Usenet authors [31].
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5.5 Promotion & Demotion Protocols
Phyllo can make use of this Trust Evaluation Framework for one of three tasks: (1)
promoting a node, (2) demoting a node, or (3) forcibly splitting a minor partition
- the forced promotion. The first and last of these tasks are taken care of by the
Promotion Protocol, while the remaining one is the responsibility of the Demotion
Protocol. Since Pastry makes use of leaf sets to manage the information affected by
moving nodes between partitions, we built the actual promotion and demotion logic
directly into the leaf set protocol, aptly named rit .secure.pastry. standard.
PartitionLeafSetProtocol.
Each of these protocol are "pull" protocols. I.e., it is up to the Phyllo node
to query the trust evaluation framework and initiate the desired process. There
is no current way for the nodes to be informed of a node reaching the promotion
threshold, or similar. Due to this, each Phyllo node has an evaluation thread,
rit .secure.pastry. SecPastryNode. PromotionEvaluator, which interacts with
the trust evaluation implementation at periodic intervals.
5.5.1 Promotion
A promotion is accomplished by sending a partition. PartitionBroadcastLeafSet
message of the type PartitionBroadcastLeafSet .Promotion. Within this mes
sage, the anchor node that is initiating the promotion specifies the target node
being promoted and will attach the new major, or primary, leaf set. This new leaf
set already includes the information of the node being promoted.
The promotion protocol is best explained as a series of steps, as represented in
Figure 5.4. We will make use of this sequence diagram in order to explain each
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portion of the protocol. The basic procedure is as explained in Sect. 4.2.3 but is
tailored to this implementation of Phyllo on Pastry.
In step 1, a Phyllo node queries an implementation of the rit . secure .pastry .
promotion. PromotionEvaluation. havePromotionO method in the trust evalu
ation framework to see if there are any nodes deserving of a promotion. If the
framework returns an affirmative response (step 2), the node requests the Node-
Handle of the node most qualified for promotion by way of PromotionEvaluation.
getPromotionNodeO. Once that information is returned (step 3), the node starts
the promotion protocol, SecPastryNode. promote (NodeHandle), which creates a
new partition.PartitionBroadcastLeafSet message. In this message the node
states the targetted NodeHandle, the current major leaf set, as well as the fact
that this is a promotion partition.PartitionBroadcastLeafSet. Promotion.
Step 4 concludes with the node transmitting the message to its LeafSetProtocol,
standard.Part itionLeafSetProtocol.
This protocol, in step 5, updates the local LeafSet with the promoting node's
information. It then informs the node being promoted and the neighboring anchor
node also effected by this promotion. The protocol uses step 6 to inform its effected
minor partition of the current promotion, so that they may update their leaf sets1 .
Concurrently, the promotion target and opposite anchor node must maintenance
their LeafSets. The anchor node, in step 7, mimics step 6 in order to inform the rest
of the effected minor nodes. From here, the second anchor node informs the rest of
the major partition of the newly promoted node. The promotion is complete once
the promotion target finishes step 9 by dividing its previous primary (minor) leaf
set into two minor leaf sets all nodes counterclockwise from it go into one leaf
set. while the remainder, clockwise nodes, fall into the other minor leaf set.
^his is not the standard leaf update referred to previously. In a normal update, information
can only be added or overwritten. In this case, it is necessary for information to be deleted.
Figure 5.4: Sequence Diagram for a Promotion within Phyllo
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5.5.2 Forced Promotion
Phyllo's Force Promotion Protocol is very similar to its regular promotion protocol.
The only differences are that it interacts via the rit .secure,pastry, promotion.
ForcePromotionEvaluation interface and can promote nodes that do not meet the
promotion threshold requirement. However, it is only used in cases where it takes
too long to wait for a node to be promoted normally. Making room in a minor
partition to accommodate a joining node or splitting a minor partition to relieve
a traffic bottleneck at an anchor node, are two viable instances to force promote a
node.
Examining this protocol's sequence diagram (Figure 5.5, it is evident of how
closely related the two promotion protocols are. To transition from the stan
dard promotion protocol, at step 1 a different call, ForcePromotionEvaluation.
splitMinorPartitionO, is used. If the return value of that call specifies a minor
partition, then the anchor node uses the SecPastryNode. forcePromoteO method
to initiate the force promotion process. Step 3, an additional call to the trust eval
uation framework, from the standard promotion protocol is not necessary for the
forced version. From here, steps 4-9 happen exactly as described in Section 5.5.1.
5.5.3 Demotion
Now that we have thoroughly detailed the abilities of Phyllo to promote nodes, we
need to provide an explanation of the demotion side of these protocols. Like its pro
motion counterpart, the demotion protocol rests in rit . secure . pastry . standard .
PartitionLeafSetProtocol and uses the promotion. PromotionEvaluation inter
face.
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Figure 5.5: Sequence Diagram for the Force Promotion Protocol to split a partition
54
The demotion protocol's sequence diagram (Figure 5.6) at first glance, appears
to be very similar to that of the promotion protocol. During the initial four step the
demotion protocol is the exact same as the promotion protocol, with the "promo
tion"
calls replaced with the demotion equivalent. The remainder of the steps are a
bit more simplistic in that we do not have to worry about the second anchor node.
After the misbehaving node is identified, a PartitionBroadcastLeafSet mes
sage is created (step 4), and it is broadcast to the major partition (step 5), including
the node targeted for demotion. Afterwards (steps 6, 8), the major partition nodes
remove the demoted node from their LeafSets. It is done this way since the leaf
set broadcast can only result in nodes being added. Therefore, we must have the
demotion protocol explicitly handle the deletion of the malicious node. When the
demoted node receives the message, in step 7, it must merge its leaf sets, if appli
cable. The resulting leaf set is then broadcast around the newly combined leaf sets.
If the demoted node was not an anchor node, it will be moved into a new minor
partition and the broadcast will only send to the two anchors for that partition.
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Figure 5.6: Sequence Diagram for a Demotion within Phyllo
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Chapter 6
Results
What we call the beginning is often the end. And to make an end is to make
a beginning. The end is where we start from.
TS Eliot, Four Quartets1
After implementing Phyllo on the Pastry overlay network (Chapter 5), experiments
were performed to measure the benefits and drawbacks of the framework. From
the hierarchical structure, Phyllo should offer at least a minimal security boost over
Pastry, but it would not be worth it if it came at the cost of significant overhead.
All of the experiments were performed using Pastry 1.4 on a Dual 2 GHz G5
PowerMac with 1 GB memory with Java 1.4.2. The size of the minor partition,
R, was strictly bounded by the leaf set size, L. However, this is not a requirement
for Phyllo but is used to force the promotion of nodes to ensure roughly equivalent
minor partition sizes. The nodes were assigned random IDs in the ID space of 2128
Each of the experiments uses the following settings: ID base 16 (6 = 4), leaf set size
\L\ = 16, maximum minor partition size \R\ = \L\ = 16, and routing table entries
'T.S. Eliot, "Four Quartets 4: Little Gidding," Poetry X, Ed. Jough Dempsey. July 2003.
[Online]. Available: http://poetry.poetryx.com/poems/758/
57
\M\ = 16. Additionally, the number of nodes, N, varies between 100 to 10,000 and
will be specified on a per experiment basis.
The first tests were performed in order to obtain a comparative view of the secu
rity standing of Phyllo. Once assured of Phyllo's security potential, the additional
overhead caused by the hierarchical structure was assessed.
6.1 Security Evaluation
The security-related attacks were done by performing some of the attacks outlined
in Chapter 3: (1) ID Assignment Problem, (2) Message Forwarding Attack, and (3)
Routing Table Maintenance Attack. The Lookup Attack was not specifically tested
as it is a variation on the Message Forwarding Attack, and Pastry does not use the
lookup protocol. Due to the nature of denial of service (DoS) attacks not targeting
P2P flaws but rather its Internet foundation, they were also ignored in the testing
phase.
6.1.1 ID Assignment & Routing Maintenance Results
Since there is no reliable way to test the ID Assignment and Routing Table Mainte
nance attacks individually and due to the fact that they are similarly perceived from
the perspective of the overlay network, they were combined into a single test. This
test involved a node properly joining the network. After the join was complete, the
node would update network with false node IDs through transmitting bad routing
updates.
Each trail was run with a static percentage of the total number of IDs being
false. With a neighbor set of 16, maximum minor partition size of 16, and 5000
total nodes, 200,000 messages were sent from a randomly chosen source towards a
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random number in the ID space. The tests were performed on both Pastry and
Pastry with Phyllo for evaluation rates of a = 99% and 90%. Data from these
experiments is presented in Table 6.1.
The results show that Phyllo successfully mitigates this attack. When compared
to an unmodified version of Pastry, Phyllo reduced the threat of routing attacks by
more than a factor of 2 in some cases! Overall, as demonstrated in Figure 6.1, it
is clear that Phyllo significantly improves the protection offered against the Sybil
attack [26], and other ID Assignment or Routing Maintenance attack vectors. Phyllo
was a success here, but can it offer protection against the Message Forwarding
Attack?
6.1.2 Message Forwarding Attack Results
In this attack scenario, we try to duplicate the Byzantine Generals Problem. Some
of the nodes on the network are malicious, i.e., once they receive a message, the
integrity of that message is lost. Due to Phyllo's partitioning scheme and trust
evaluation protocol, there should be less chance of one of these bad nodes needing
to forward a message.
The overlay network is setup with a certain percentage ofmalicious nodes. Unlike
the previous scenario, all of these nodes join the network byway of the join protocol.
Whenever one of the malicious nodes receives a message that it should forward on
to another node, the node drops the message instead. This is done because once the
integrity of a message is lost, it can never be re-established; the number ofmalicious
nodes, beyond the first, that touch a message is not important.
Table 6.2 shows the percentage of messages successfully delivered without be
compromised. The data is from Pastry and Phyllo with a = 99% or 90%, with 5000
messages exchanged. The same data is also visually represented in Figure 6.2. Here
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Percentage Pastry Phyllo Phyllo
False IDs (a = 99%) (a = 90%)
0 0 0 0
0.1 0.26 0.10 0.12
0.2 0.47 0.17 0.23
0.3 0.65 0.27 0.32
0.4 0.77 0.36 0.42
0.5 0.85 0.44 0.53
0.6 0.92 0.54 0.61
0.7 0.95 0.62 0.67
0.8 0.98 0.72 0.77
0.9 1 0.8 0.83
1 1 1 1
Table 6.1: Percentage of messages routed through false node IDs (b
16,|M| = 16,JV = 5000)
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Figure 6.1: The Probability that a Message is Routed Through a False ID
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it is evident that Pastry has a more polynomial correlation between the number
of dropped or corrupted messages and the percentage of malicious nodes2. On the
other hand, the same relation in Phyllo is mostly linear. Most importantly, Phyllo
outperforms Pastry in every aspect by at least 10%!
For the average message (i.e., a message requiring 3 hops to route in Pastry or
3.75 hops in Phyllo3), Phyllo has a much better overall success rate (Figure 6.3).
When only a relatively small percentage (< 10%) of a network's nodes are malicious,
Pastry tends to provide better reliability. However, Pastry's routing success rate
plummets quickly as the percentage of malicious nodes increases. During this time,
the same rate of success in Phyllo4 remains fairly constant. Once malicious nodes
make up 90% or more of any network, it becomes almost impossible to successfully
route a message in either Phyllo or Pastry.
6.2 Networking Overhead
We have already proven that Phyllo successfully hardens an existing overlay network
against some of their largest threats. Now, we must determine if Phyllo is worthy
of implementation; i.e., does Phyllo add an acceptable amount of overhead? If
the overhead is too high, the cost will outweigh the security benefits. As with all
security-related issues, we are faced with the balance of security and efficiency.
The authors of Pastry [2] claim that it is capable of routing an application
message between two randomly chosen nodes in no more than log2a n hops, where
2The chance for successful delivery in Pastry [2] under similar scenarios is (1 - p)h, where p is
the percentage of malicious nodes and h is the total number of hops along a message's route.
3Average hop data taken from Table 6.3.
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Percentage of Pastry Phyllo Phyllo
Malicious Nodes (a = 99%) (a = 90%)
0 1 1 1
0.10 0.74 0.90 0.88
0.20 0.54 0.80 0.75
0.30 0.36 0.70 0.62
0.40 0.24 0.60 0.55
0.50 0.15 0.50 0.46
0.60 0.07 0.40 0.37
0.70 0.04 0.30 0.25
0.80 0.014 0.21 0.18
0.90 0.005 0.11 0.10
1 0 0 0
Table 6.2: Percentage of messages delivered without being corrupted by a malicious
node (b = 4, \R\ = \L\ = 16, \M\ = 16,N = 5000)
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in this case, b 4. Therefore, to be successful, Phyllo should be of the same order
of magnitude, ~ 0(log16n) hops.
The experiment used to measure the average hop counts involved sending 200,000
messages from a random node towards a random destination. This was done on Pas
try both with and without Phyllo, and was performed on overlay networks consisting
of 100 to 10,000 nodes and b = 4, \R\ = \L\ = 16, \M\ = 16. The hop count of each
message was recorded, and the average (mean) of the data was used (Table 6.3).
Figure 6.4 shows the data from Table 6.3 plotted on a logarithmic axis for the
network size. The experimental data gathered from Pastry is clearly 0(log26n).
While the data from Phyllo appears to be of an equivalent order, it is not known.
However, if we place an approximate upper boundary of log26 N+ 1, Phyllo's average
hop count would appear to agree.
Examining Phyllo's routing protocol, these results make logical sense. The mod
ifications to Pastry's routing protocol (Section 4.2.2) call for an additional hop to be
made when switching partitions. Therefore, in the worst case, an application mes
sage in Phyllo will have to be routed between two different minor partitions, whereby
adding at most two additional hops. For each route in Pastry, the equivalent route
in Phyllo will be either 0, 1, or 2 hops longer. When performed over a large number
of routes, the average number of additional hops should be approximately 1.
We conclude that this is a reasonably small overhead to incur for the wealth of
security benefits reaped because of Phyllo. Furthermore, when we analyzed the hop
count data further, Phyllo actually provides a benefit to those networks that have to
deal with unreliable network connection, such as an ad hoc network. While Phyllo
provides a higher average hop count, it reduces the maximal hop count. Table 6.4
shows the maximum hop count recorded out of the 200,000 messages sent.
With a network size of 10,000 nodes, Phyllo drastically reduces the maximum
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Network
Size Pastry Phyllo
100 1.7 2.4
500 2.2 3.0
1000 2.5 3.25
2000 2.7 3.5
5000 3.0 3.75
8000 3.2 3.9
10000 3.33 4.15
Table 6.3: Average (mean) Hop Count for Messages Sent in Pastry and Phyllo
(6 = 4,|JR| = |L| = 16,|M| = 16)
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Figure 6.4: Average Hop Counts for Phyllo compared to Pastry Overlay Routing
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Network
Size Pastry Phyllo
100 3 4
500 3 5
1000 9 5
2000 9 6
5000 21 7
8000 22 8
10000 32 8
Table 6.4: Maximum Hop Count for Messages Sent in Pastry and Phyllo (b
4, |_R| = |L| = 16, |M| = 16)
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Figure 6.5: Maximum Number of Routing Hops in Pastry versus Phyllo
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hop count required to route a message. While Pastry needs 32 hops, Phyllo reduces
that by 75% to use only 8 hops! As the network grows, Pastry's maximal hop count
shoots up from 3 to 32 hops. During that same period of growth, Phyllo uses only 4
more hops (ranging from 4 to 8 hops). At smaller network sizes, Phyllo uses only a
couple of additional hops. This means that Phyllo is a better solution for networks
where security is a major issue, or networks that have unreliable connections.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
Few things are impossible to diligence and skill. Great works are performed
not by strength, but perseverance.
Dr. Samuel Johnson
Overall, we feel that Phyllo was a success. It provides hardened security to ar
chitecturally weak overlay networks with only a slight network latency overhead.
We recommend that all overlay networks that need heightened security or run over
unreliable connections, implement Phyllo onto the basic overlay protocol.
However, the implementation of Phyllo on Pastry is just one example of the
framework's power. The features such as adjustable partition size and depth allow
for further customization, while the trust evaluation framework can be modified to
fit any number of node control scenarios. The potential for Phyllo is even greater
when you examine the wealth of overlay network candidates from CAN to Chord
and even Napster and BitTorrent. There is definitely a future for Phyllo.
The details for this future will be detailed in Section 7.1. Here, we will explain
some of the possible research routes for Phyllo. Afterward, we will explore those
projects with similar features and goals to Phyllo. This will provide a look into
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related projects to allow for further research and comparison in the fields of peer-
to-peer technologies and security.
7.1 Future Work
Thus far, we have only proven the basic concept of Phyllo, that the hierarchical lay
out and promotion/demotion protocols benefit the security in an overlay network.
Phyllo was only implemented on a single overlay network and only the basic promo
tion/demotion protocol, along with the trust evaluation schema, functionality was
evaluated. There is much room for further research.
Phyllo can be disected into three basic components: (1) hierarchical partitioning,
(2) routing, and (3) promotion and demotion protocol, including the trust evaluation
framework. In terms of the partitioning, only the most basic form was utilized.
The hierarchy can be extended in both the number of levels and size. Increasing
the maximum minor partition size (up to infinity), allows for a more secure major
partition. At the same time, it places a burden on the anchor nodes and may
hamper the routing efficiency. One possible research question is to determine the
most efficient (i.e., the best security to overhead/performance ratio) minor partition
size.
A related question would concern the best security to number of hierarchical lay
ers trade off. If the number of partition layers were to increase beyond two, to what
extent would there be a benefit to security? Doing this would definitely increase the
overall hop counts, but is that sacrifice worth it? There is most likely some optimal
number of layers and ranges of partition sizes for networks with concerns such as
security, connectivity, bandwidth, resources (memory or computational), etc.
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Each of these decisions impacts the network routing. Another variable in the
search for the best Phyllo implementation is the underlying routing algorithm. This
time around, we chose to inherit Pastry's network structure and routing algorithm.
Would a routing algorithm based on Euclidean distances, such as CAN, be better?
What about a network similar to Chord which supports lookups, and will send the
messages directly to the lookup's result?
The final research area, and possibly the most interesting, involves the promotion
and demotion protocols. Phyllo is possibly the only network to feature the possibility
for nodes to dynamically move between partitions. With this advantage comes a
number of unanswered questions: when is the right time to promote? demote?
Is there any way which a malicious node can exploit the promotion or demotion
protocol? Should a misbehaving node be kicked from the network if it misbehaves
and cannot be further demoted?
Acting in support of these protocols, the trust evaluation framework will also
play a role in maximizing an overlay network's capability. In the future, we would
like to explore the various metrics that we could use to evaluate a node. The notion
of the framework could be extended to allow for groups to decide a node's fate;
maybe something similar to a majority vote is needed to take action against a node.
We could also experiment with the threshold settings used as decision makers in
the protocols. Generally, we would like to know, what is the best trust evaluation
framework for a given scenario?
Additionally, some of current trust evaluation criteria, such as ensuring the
proper forwarding of messages, relies on information that can be manipulated.
Nodes can change the sending address to appear to have come from elsewhere;
there is no validation performed. While this is probably specific to the Pastry im
plementation, it does pose potential security problems and should be fixed.
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We will also attempt to evaluate Phyllo in a larger environment. The data
presented in Chapter 6 was gathered from locally performed experiments with a
maximum of 10,000 nodes. To more accurately reflect the product's end use, it is
necessary to test with a larger population of nodes that are spread across a more
realistic, network environment. The network research environment provided via
collaborations such as planetlab [32], may provide the proper testbed.
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Appendix A
User's Guide
A.l Installation
The files referred to within this document can be found on the accompanying CD-
ROM, via the Phyllo project website (http : //www . cs . rit . edu/~wjh3710/thesis),
or through the provided URLs.
The source code of Phyllo is written in Java and tested using Java 1.4.2. Before
any of this code can be run or compiled, Java SDK version 1.4.2 or later must be
installed on the target system. The latest versions of the Java SDK can be found
on Sun Microsystems's Java website: http://java.sun.com.
This implementation of Phyllo requires Pastry, which can be obtained off of the
official Pastry website: http://freepastry.rice.edu/. Phyllo was designed and
tested on Pastry 1.4.0 and due to modifications made to the messaging protocols
in the later releases (Pastry 1.4.1 at the time of publication), Phyllo is not directly
compatible with those releases. Additionally, in order to get Phyllo to work, a patch
must be applied to rice/pastry/leafset/LeafSet .Java to change the scope of
the baseld variable from private to protected. This is necessary so that Phyllo can
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extend this class.
This process has already been completed on the Pastry files on the accompanying
CD. Additionally, in the patches directory, there is a patch file and script to apply the
patch to the LeafSet. Java file. After this process, the code must be recompiled.
Instructions for installing and running FreePastry are located in FreePastry-1 .
4-source/docs/README . html.
Pre-patched versions of the source code and Java archive (jar) are available on the
accompanying CD in FreePastry-1.4-source/src or FreePastry- 1 .4-modified.
jar in the main directory. Accompanying distribution files are also included in the
FreePastry- 1 .4-source directory, as well as the Pastry JavaDocs provided by Rice
University, in FreePastry- 1 .4-source/docs/javadocs/.
The Phyllo source code can be found in Phyllo/src, while an already compiled
archive, Phyllo . j ar is located in the main directory. A complete set of JavaDocs
can also be found in Phyllo/docs. A copy of this documentation is located in
Instructions.html on the CD or at http://www.cs.rit.edu/~wjh3710/thesis/
Instructions . html.
A.2 Running Phyllo
The Phyllo implementation contains three test classes. These main classes are lo
cated in the rit . secure .pastry .testing package and are named SecHelloWorld,
TestRouteTableDurability, and GatherMessageData.
In order to run any of the tests, the Java executable must be informed of the
locations of the Phyllo and Pastry classes to use. This can be done by declaring the
$CLASSPATH environment variable or using the -cp flag with the Java executable.
Either way, Java needs to know the path for the root package of the compiled . class
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files or full path of the JAR archives. For example, to execute the SecHelloWorld
program from the root of the CD, one would enter:
bash/0 Java -cp ./Phyllo. jar: 1 .4-modified. jar\
rit . secure . pastry . testing . SecHelloWorld
The SecHelloWorld can be replaced by any of the other two test files' names to run
them. Additionally, there are arguments that accompany each program, which can
be seen with the -help flag or described in that class's JavaDoc. Here is a listing
and description of the most important options:
-msgs m The number of messages, m, to send after the nodes have been created.
-nodes n The number of standard nodes, n, to create.
-malicious o The number of malicious nodes, o, to create.
-eval a The a value, a, used to simulate the efficiency of the Trust Evaluation
Framework.
-phyllo Run the test using the Phyllo framework with Pastry.
-pastry Run the test using only Pastry.
A.2.1 Producing the Results
This section will explain the process and scripts used to generate the results pre
sented in Chapter 6 of my thesis paper.
The files discussed within this section are located in the Experiments/Scripts/
directory on the accompanying CD-ROM. Here is a listing of the directory contents:
data_parsers - Directory containing scripts to parse the program output
data_parsers/success_count.awk - Counts the number of successfully routed
messages versus the total number of messages sent with run_route_test .sh.
Usage: awk - fdata.parsersjsuccess.count.awk < data-file >
data_parsers/summarize.awk - Collects the hop count data output from the
run_hop_test . sh script.
Usage: awk - f'datajparsers/
'
summarize.awk < data-file >
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data_parsers/sybil_summary.awk - Determines how often a message was re
ceived by an invalid node. Used with the run_fwd_test . sh test.
Usage: awk fdatayparsers/'sybilsummary.awk < data-file >
README.txt - Explains the scripts usage and other notes.
run_fwd_test.sh - Run one instance of the simulation with malicious applications
to simulate false nodes (Sybil Attack)
Usage: ./run-fwd-test.sh < output-file >< %malicious > \phyllo\pastry\
run_hop_test.sh - Establish a network and send test messages to gather each mes
sage's final hop count.
Usage: ./runJiop-test.sh < output-file >< Anodes >< #msgs > \phyllo\pastry]
run_repeated.sh - Run the run_route_test . sh script for networks containing 0-
90% (in 10% increments) of malicious nodes.
Usage: ./runjrepeated.sh < alpha > \phyllo\pastry]
run_route_test.sh - Run a test over a network with a specified concentration of
malicious nodes. Each malicious node will only send or receive a message. If
a message should be forwarded, a malicious node will drop that message.
Usage: ./run-route-test,sh < output-file >< %malicious >
< alpha > \phyllo\pastry]
Each of the bash shell scripts take a couple of parameters. Most should be self-
explanatory, but this is just a reminder that alpha refers to the a efficiency metric
for the Trust Evaluation Framework and is simulated in these experiments. Also,
the user may specify either
"phyllo"
or
"pastry"
as an input to each script. This
tells the program whether or not to use the Phyllo framework in addition to the
standard Pastry network (identical functionality to the -phyllo and -pastry flags
in the previous section) .
The results of running these scripts can be found in Experiments/Results/
This is the same data and graphs that were presented previously in this thesis.
Since the Java programs outlined above make use of a random number generator to
assign IDs, and determine message sources and destinations, individual results are
guaranteed to vary for larger network sizes.
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A.2.2 Writing Phyllo Applications
These experimental programs provide a nice layout and starting point to enable
developers to begin writing more functional Phyllo applications.
Pastry (and Phyllo) require two different
"application" types in order to create a
single P2P application. The first is a node application. This application is part of the
node and handles all application-specific protocols, such as searching, file transfer,
user messaging any application message. Multiple node applications can be
run on the same overlay because they are identified using an address unique to each
application type. Examples of node applications are rit . secure . pastry . testing .
GatherDataApp and rit . secure . pastry . testing . Rout ingTableTestApp.
The other application type is the main class (containing the mainmethod) and is
used to initialize the node and node application. This initialization process involves
assigning the node an ID and then starting the bootstrapping, or join, protocol.
"Main applications" such as GatherMessageData and TestRouteTableDurability
demonstrate the minimal responsibilities that this application type provides.
The last major piece necessary to write a P2P application that uses Phyllo,
is the message. Pastry passes instances of the rice.pastry.messaging.Message
object between the various overlay nodes. The developer is responsible for creating
a message specific to the node application it is to be supporting. All necessary
application-level data should be encapsulated inside of a message instance, rit .
secure. pastry. testing.TraceMessage is one message example that can be used
to track message hop counts.
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Appendix B
Phyllo JavaDocs
The following list of classes, and their associated JavaDocs, can be found within the
distribution of the Phyllo framework:
rit . secure . pastry
> SecPastryNode
rit .secure.pastry.direct
> DirectSecPastryNode
> DirectSecPastryNodeFactory
rit. secure.pastry. direct .malicious
t> MaliciousDirectPastryNode
> MaliciousPastryNodeFactory
t> MaliciousSphereNetwork
rit .secure.pastry.partition
> PartitionBroadcastLeafSet
i> PartitionLeafSet
rit . secure.pastry. promotion
> DemotionMessage
> ForcedPromotionEvaluation
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> PromotionEvalutation
> PromotionMessage
> PromotionProtocolAddress
rit .secure.pastry. standard
> PartitionJoinProtocol
> PartitionLeafSetProtocol
> PartitionPromotionProtocol
> PartitionRouteSetProtocol
> PartitionRouter
rit . secure .pastry. standard.malicious
> MaliciousLeafSetProtocol
rit .secure.pastry. testing
> BasicEvaluation
> EvaluationData
> GatherDataApp
> GatherDataApp. DataAddress
o GatherMessageData
> MinorPartitionEnforcement
> RoutingTableTestApp
_> RoutingTableTestApp.DataAddress
t> SecHelloWorld
o TestRouteTableDurability
i> TraceMessage
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